beware... rough draft below

Chinese Discourse on Relations with Japan: Using the Diaoyu Islands Conflict as a Case Study

I. Introduction

Historically, China has played various roles in Asia. They range from far-reaching superpower, to “sick man” of the region, to victim of imperial power and invasion, to inward-looking socialist society. Today, China is on the rise once again, and reexamining its roles both in Asia and the greater world community. When China embarked on reform and opening in the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping instructed that China ought to “bide our time, hide our capabilities, and never be in the limelight.” Since that era, Chinese foreign policy has kept fairly consistent with Deng’s philosophy. However, recent foreign policy decisions suggest that the Chinese may be aware of their rising stature, and have become tired of this so-called “biding” and “hiding.” Is now the time for China to step into the “limelight” of the Asian region?

In this paper, I present educated Chinese people’s attitudes about foreign policy, and analyze the significance of these opinions for the greater stability of the region. In order to address these issues, I zero in on relations with Japan. Japan and China have a long history full of conflict and emotion. It seems logical that, sensing its increasing influence, China would first look toward relations with Japan for vindication. A perfect opportunity recently arose for this case study: the fish boat incident that occurred off the disputed Diaoyu Islands in September. This incident, detailed below, brought China and Japan into a direct diplomatic conflict and caused great indignation on both sides.

I engaged in traditional and field research to find out about Chinese reactions to the Diaoyu Island issue and fish boat incident. My research revealed that educated Chinese people are extremely dissatisfied with their leaders’ “passive” reaction to the conflict. Overall, my analysis concludes that this group would like to see more of their nation’s power exerted in the international sphere. This is surprising, in light of the widespread perception abroad that Chinese foreign policy reactions to the Diaoyu incident were already uncharacteristically aggressive. Nevertheless, China’s leaders have maintained a moderate and rational approach to the conflict, compared with the desired reactions vocalized by the subjects of my research.

II. Background: Diaoyu Island Issue

The Diaoyu Islands (Japanese name Senkaku, English name Pinnacle) are a group of small, uninhabited islands in the East China Sea. When Japan defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, the islands were ceded from China to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. However, after Japan’s surrender in 1945, the islands were relinquished by Japan as part of the San Francisco and Potsdam agreements that ended World War II. The United States then administered the islands from 1945 to 1972. During this time, the issue was further complicated by a United Nations announcement of valuable, underwater hydrocarbon deposits in the Diaoyu Island area in 1968. Finally, from 1970-1972, the islands were transitioned back to Japan under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, considered part of the greater Okinawa region.

Immediately after this transition, both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) announced formal claims to the Diaoyu Islands. The claims were based on numerous factors, including both Chinese and Japanese historical records of Chinese administration of the islands, and Chinese exclusion from the talks and treaties that determined the fate of the islands throughout the 20th century. Oddly enough, the PRC and the ROC present a united front on this issue. Both agree, “the islands are part of Taiwan as part of Toucheng Township in Yilan County.” Therefore, by making formal claims, Beijing implies that the Diaoyu Islands are part of Taiwan, and transitively part of the greater PRC. Japan, on the other hand, responded with claims of its sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands as part of its Okinawa Prefecture. In practical terms, most parties outside the conflict agree that Japan continues to control the Diaoyu area, even if its claims are not fully legitimate.

The history and complexity of this issue provide ample explanation for its volatility with all parties involved: the PRC, ROC, Japan, and less directly, the United States. Many ultrasensitive themes are at play, including sovereignty, natural resources, bilateral relations, and nationalism. For China in particular, the narratives of national humiliation and loss of territory also raise emotions regarding the Diaoyu Islands. Nevertheless, the PRC and Japan seem to understand the volatility of the issue and wish to avoid serious diplomatic or military disputes on its behalf. When the two nations established official relations in 1978, they agreed to “shelve” the matter for future generations to address.

Since then, a number of events have threatened China and Japan’s “agreement to disagree.” Most recently, a Chinese fishing trawler in the Diaoyu area was pursued by the Japanese coast guard, and collided with two of the Japanese patrol boats on September 7, 2010. The Japanese Coast Guard took the Chinese trawler, its crew, and its captain pending legal charges. Chinese official reactions included “suspended bilateral exchanges at and above the ministerial levels, and halted contact with Japan on the issues of increasing civil flights and expanding aviation rights between the two countries,” as well as “an embargo on sales to Japan of rare earths, minerals used in hybrid cars and electrics parts.” Japan released the crew on September 13 and the captain on September 24. No one was charged.

III. Survey and Answers

In order to gather information on Chinese people’s attitudes toward the Diaoyu conflict and current relations about Japan, I conducted a survey using an open-ended questionnaire. Men and women of different ages answered the survey. Half were students at the Beijing Language and Culture University, and half were employees of a Beijing software development company, effectively limiting the pool to educated, urban residents. I asked eight simple questions with the goal of finding out how people learn about the Diaoyu issue, what their subsequent opinions are, and what they predict for the future of China-Japan relations.

The questions were: (1) 你什么时候听到或者看到钓鱼岛（渔船）事件？ When did you hear about the Diaoyu Island fish boat issue? (2) 说一下什么时候，通过什么方式，你第一次听到了钓鱼岛事件？ Describe the first time you heard about the Diaoyu Island conflict. (3) 你最近还在关注钓鱼岛事件吗？如果还在关注，请谈一谈你了解的情况。Have you continued to follow the issue? If so, explain what you have learned. (4) 中国政府对渔船事件做出的反应怎么样？How did the Chinese government react to the recent fish boat incident? (5) 对政府的反应，你满意吗？为什么？Are you satisfied with this reaction? Why? (6) 对钓鱼岛的事情，你和父母有没有不同的看法？你和朋友呢？Do your parents or friends have different opinions than you do? (7) 年轻人对钓鱼岛的看法是什么样 ？老人呢？What do young people think of the Diaoyu issue? Old people? (8) 最后，你认为在你的有生之年，中日关系会不会有所改善？Do you believe relations with Japan will see positive changes within your lifetime?

Of the 14 people surveyed, a clear majority of 9 people first heard about the fish boat incident “online.” The remaining 5 heard through conversations with friends, family, or teachers. Regarding the first time they heard of the Diaoyu Island territorial conflict, the answers “high school history textbook” and “online” tied for majority. Others saw on television, read online or in the newspaper, received cell phone news updates, or heard in conversation with family members and peers. These answers confirmed my expectation that most people rely on online news for information about current events and foreign policy, but were aware of the territory dispute prior to this event, often encountering it through education.

The third question (have you continued to follow the issue?) was intended to differentiate the interested from the indifferent. Only 3 people, all university students, answered that they have not followed the issue and have no opinion. Others, who answered that they have been too busy to follow closely, still provided detailed opinions in following questions. This gives the impression that one does not need to actively follow the Diaoyu Island/fish boat issues in order to hear about them, comparable to current events like the war in Iraq and the economic crisis in American news and daily life.

The following two questions (how did the Chinese government react to this incident, and were you satisfied with this reaction?) generated the most surprising and telling answers. 2 people responded, “I don’t know.” Another 2 responded that they felt satisfied because the reaction was “rational” and “conservative.” This leaves the majority of 10 people who expressed open dissatisfaction with the Chinese government’s reaction and provided distinct reasons why.

This group unanimous agreed that the Chinese government’s reaction was “not strong enough,” to quote several answers and paraphrase the rest. They responded that China had resisted Japan’s actions in words, but not in actions. A 39 year-old male software engineer answered, “There have been no practical actions, only slogans.” A 21 year-old female university student said the reaction amounted to, “Not much, just lip service, the response was almost equal to zero.” A few people elaborated on this opinion, saying that soft power and diplomacy cannot replace military force when it comes to asserting territorial sovereignty. One university student listed the following proscriptions:
“permanently ban sale of ore to Japan, increase taxes on Japanese goods sold in China, strengthen China’s military, increase economic restrictions on exports of raw materials to Japan, increase corporate taxes on Japanese companies in China, step up patrols by Chinese submarines in Japanese waters, investigate the Japanese blockade of the Straights of Malacca and Japanese monitoring of fishing vessels.”

While this student’s response stands out as the strongest, she has captured the sentiment of the others who believe that China’s “sovereignty” came under attack with the fish boat incident, and was not adequately defended by its leaders.
Questions 6 and 7 were designed to gauge opinions among different generations. Here, students unanimously expressed that they are “radical,” “indignant,” and believe that China must “take back what is ours.” They explained that their parents and grandparents are “conservative,” “unconcerned,” and “sympathetic to the government’s methods.” Middle-aged people’s explanations differed. Some responded that young people are more indifferent than the elderly, because they never suffered Japanese war crimes, ethnic hatred, or refusal to surrender; they only “inherited the hatred of the fathers of this nation.” Others responded that Chinese youth is quite angry, and is well informed of what Japan has done to China “in the past and what it is doing now.” Nevertheless, most agreed that all generations are disappointed with the current situation.

To the final question (do you believe relations will improve in your lifetime?) 2 people answered maybe, and 1 added that this would be thanks to China’s rising power. However, a strong majority of 12 answered “no” and explained why. A 49 year-old male manager said he did not want relations with Japan to improve; Japan is simply “too arrogant.” Other reasons for people’s predictions that relations would not improve included: resentment between the two nations is too deep, the fish boat conflict has worsened conditions, Japan will never show remorse the way Germany did, historical reasons prevent improvement, the United States has interfered with the relationship, China cannot continue to be passive while Japan is aggressive, Japan will never abandon militarist ideology, neither side will compromise, and most foreboding, “Either China will wipe out Japan or Japan will wipe out China.”

IV. Analysis: Public Discourse on Diaoyu Issue in China

Many analysts in the West and in China’s neighboring nations are concerned by China’s recent foreign policy moves with respect to the two Koreas, territorial disputes with Vietnam, and the recent fish boat incident with Japan. This fall, one of the hottest topics in foreign policy was China’s “nationalism” and “new assertiveness,” which generated fears about instability in the greater Asian region (WSJ). As presented in the field research presented above, there is a giant gap between the domestic and foreign perceptions of China’s policy toward Japan. The Chinese public believes their leaders to be meek and passive, while observers abroad call them “petulant and provocative.” I used traditional research, online media, and follow up questions to examine how this gap develops.

I found the most effective fuel to the flames of anti-Japanese sentiment to be in the state-sponsored media. While many survey-takers added that they had grown up with grown-ups talking about Japan’s past crimes, with Japanese “bad guys” in all their favorite films, and with denunciation of the Japanese in school settings, it is the online media that informs their opinions about such current events. Media coverage of the Diaoyu fish boat incident was overwhelming. Radio 86 Beijing correspondent Thomas Rippe reported,
"In the very beginning the response in the media was very intense, I guess the only word really is propaganda. Some of the articles contained the most politically driven and politically motivated language that I've seen come out of the state media since I've been here. Every story that went out included Chinas demand that the captain be released. And they included all these, sort of veiled threats and demands for apologies and very, very, very intense political language in all the stories that went out on the whole issue.”

I was able to confirm this for myself by reading English translations of articles on the Xinhua and China Daily websites. The search “Diaoyu fish boat Japan” generated over 30 articles from each of these news sources.
An exemplary article, “Japan's actions over Diaoyu Islands defy facts, draw protests,” was published in Xinhua on September 21st. The article’s first subheading was “CHINA'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER DIAOYU ISLANDS UNDISPUTABLE,” which detailed historical records of China’s presence in the Diaoyu Islands (“part of China's Taiwan Province”) since the 1403. The second subheading, “JAPAN'S CLAIM CONTRADICTS INTERNATIONAL NORMS,” refutes several of Japan’s claims to the Diaoyu Islands and says Japan blatantly violated international maritime law.

The third subheading, “PROTESTS FROM CHINESE PUBLIC,” tells about Chinese public reactions in cities and online. The author points out that the fish boat incident’s timing commemorates the 79th anniversary of Japan’s invasion of China. Touching on the national humiliation narrative, it reports, “In Beijing, dozens of protestors gathered outside the Japanese embassy, unfurling banners and shouting ‘Japan, get out of the Diaoyu Islands,’ ‘Boycott Japanese goods,’ ‘Don't forget national humiliation, don't forget Sept. 18.” The article states that protests have taken place all across China, from major mainland cities, to Taiwan, to Hong Kong. It adds that the “Diaoyu” and “Zhan Qixiong” (the name of the fish boat captain) have become the most searched words on the net. The final subheading, “DAMAGE TO SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS,” explains the bilateral meetings between China and Japan that were cancelled because of the controversy. It also quotes the Wall Street Journal as calling Japan’s actions “very dangerous.”

The media has also tapped into people’s emotions, inspiring anger toward Japan. On September 22nd, Xinhua published an article titled, “Torture, anger overshadow family reunion festival for relatives of detained Chinese fisherman.” The article reported on the condition of the detained fishermen’s families. One crewmember’s elderly mother had suddenly died of grief when she learned of the situation. Other villagers said they would starve without the right to fish in China’s territorial seas. Captain Zhan’s mother wept for two days straight through painful cataracts, as did his 13 year-old son who cried, he hoped the Japanese would give his dad back soon.

Although young Chinese people have shared their distrust for state media with me in interviews, this anti-Japanese sentiment somehow takes a strong hold in their generation. I asked older university students about this phenomenon, and they attributed it to 愤青 “fenqing,” or angry youth. According to them, young people, especially those born after 1990, are caught up in their own dissatisfaction with everything. No matter what the topic is, they are dissatisfied with it. They are “self-centered” and refuse to try to understand other points of view. So when conflict with Japan arises, they become almost indiscriminately angry, with both the foreign aggressor and the incompetent leaders at home.

The media inflamed Chinese public opinion and created high expectations for hard-line foreign policy against Japan’s actions. But only weeks later, the tone of the media abruptly shifted. Rippe explains,
“The state media has [begun] reporting that at the Asia-Europe summit, Wen Jiabao and Naoto Kan apparently sat down in a hallway and talked over a few things. And so now the state media apparatus are starting to send these signals that the situation is turning to normal, and that we can get back to the business of business.”

Chinese leaders are aware that their public perceives any conversation and compromise over issues of territorial sovereignty is as loss of face (WSJ); this sentiment is undoubtedly linked to media as presented in the above Xinhua articles. Nevertheless, it seems that rationality prevailed among China’s leaders. They turned to the media once again, but this time to cool heads and reassure that further action was unnecessary.

V. Conclusion

I believe the combination of inflaming media, receptive youth, and retracted sentiment generated the extreme disappointment and calls for more aggressive foreign policy that I received in my surveys. In the days immediately following the fish boat incident, Chinese media hyped up an opportunity to assert Chinese power and teach Japan a lesson. Soon after, leaders changed their tune for reasons that aren’t completely clear. Perhaps they had never intended to be so aggressive; perhaps they realized that this nationalistic approach would not be well received outside China. Either way, the media aroused anger against Japan and then left Chinese people feeling like their demands had not been fulfilled. This is a dangerous pattern for China, because it sets up expectations for the public that cannot be met with rational, realistic foreign policy. Most of the world would consider a military confrontation between China and Japan over these uninhabited islands to be absolutely unthinkable, yet several survey answers advocated military force as the only way for China to solve this problem once and for all.

Although anti-Japanese sentiment and the desire to confront Japan in foreign policy seems ingrained in Chinese public opinion, state sponsored media can reverse this trend just as effectively as it perpetuates it. Instead of presenting one-sided analysis and harping on Japan’s crimes, it can emphasize the need for cooperation and the undesirable consequences of conflict. For example, not one of these articles mentioned that Japan and the United States are China’s top two trade partners. A full-blown conflict over the Diaoyu Islands could irreparably damage relations with both these nations. Chinese media analysis also ignores the fact that aggressive foreign policy has raised anxiety in its Asian neighbors and driven them closer to the United States. From the American perspective, this might be advantageous, but both Chinese leaders and citizens would probably like to prevent such movement.

If the Chinese public became aware of the limitations of aggressive foreign policy, perhaps they would not be so frustrated with the current state of relations with Japan. One important underlying desire that surfaced in my research was for China to be a respected member of the international community. Many Chinese believe this can only be achieved by hard-line insistence on China’s will in world affairs. However, if responsibility and rationality can be emphasized as characteristics of a sophisticated world power, the Chinese public might embrace these values and become more sympathetic to their leaders’ foreign policy decisions. In turn, leaders would not be under such great pressure to preserve “face” in international affairs.